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Synopsis
Ambiguity of insurance payment in earthquake insurance can be one of main reasons of low
purchase rate. We empirically investigate the influence of the ambiguity on the decision to buy hy-
pothetical earthquake insurance and the relationship with individual characteristics based on MEU
model using questionnaire data. The main results of this paper are summarized as follows. First, re-
spondent’s preferences to the insurance with 1, 5, and 10% unreimbursement risk are generally in-
consistent with expected utility theory. Second, respondents demanded more than 50% reduction in
premium to offset each unreimbursement risk. Third, the ambiguity premium is larger in men who
purchase earthquake insurance, have never received insurance payment, and distrust insurance
companies than each correspondents, and increases with age, education level.
Keywords: ambiguity, earthquake insurance, probabilistic insurance, Maximin Expected Utility
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1. Introduction
Individual disaster-prevention efforts play important
roles to mitigate the damage and to promote the emer-
gency restoration. As for earthquake, the earthquake
insurance can be helpful to repair or rebuild a damaged
houses because the government can not sufficiently assist
earthquake victims due to the financial budget constraint.
However, purchase rate of earthquake insurance is low in
Japan (only 17.2% households buy the earthquake in-
surance). There are several possible reasons: adverse
selection, perception bias, and ambiguity of insurance
payment. In the adverse selection mechanism, only peo-
ple who live in area with frequent earthquake purchase
earthquake insurance and this raise the insurance fee and
prevent other people from buying the earthquake insur-
ance. Perception bias is the underestimation of risk and
anticipated damage from earthquake. Ambiguity of in-
surance payment means the lack of knowledge on earth-
quake insurance policy and insurance adjustment makes
people hesitate to purchase it. I focus the last reason,
ambiguity of insurance payment.
In this study, we empirically investigate the influ-
ence of the ambiguity on the decision to buy hypo-
thetical earthquake insurance and the relationship with
individual characteristics based on an econometric
model using questionnaire data. Very few empirical
studies on ambiguity are based on econometric models
except finance field where aggregated data are used.
Our study is new in that we deal with the ambiguity of
disaster and use individual data. This makes it possible
to examine the influence of individual characteristics to
the ambiguity size that they perceive.
The paper is structured as follows. We start with a
explanation why ambiguity of insurance payment pre-
vents people from purchasing the earthquake insurance
in Section 1. Section 2 present the MEU model we will 
use, and Section 3 presents the estimation results.
2. Ambiguity
Ambiguity of insurance payment stems from the
unclear criteria that the insurance adjuster will use to 
assess the damage from earthquake. Consumers feel
ambiguity due to the following three reasons even if 
the criteria are clear on insurer’s side. First one is
asymmetric information. Earthquake insurance con-





京都大学防災研究所年報 第 49 号 C 平成 18 年 4 月      
Annuals of Disas. Prev. Res. Inst., Kyoto Univ., No. 49 C, 2006      
 
 
particular, expertise of house structure is required to 
assess the damage of house. Therefore, there is no way 
other than to believe the insurance adjuster’s assess-
ment. Second is the rarity of the payment of the earth-
quake insurance compared to other insurances such as 
mobile, fire or injury insurance. Earthquake that dam-
ages houses rarely occurs so that we don’t have a suffi-
cient number of cases to roughly grasp when and how 
mach earthquake insurance is paid. Thus, consumers 
feel concerned over the possibility that the claim is not 
paid as they expect. In this case, they think of earth-
quake insurance as “probabilistic insurance”. 
Insurance is a contract in which an individual pays 
a fixed premium and is promised to be paid in the 
event that a specific hazard occurs. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) introduced the notion of “probabilistic 
insurance”, namely an insurance policy which, in the 
event that the hazard occurs, pay off with some prob-
ability strictly less than one. They showed, for a par-
ticular type of probabilistic insurance, that while con-
sumers find such policy unattractive, an expected util-
ity maximizer would actually perfect the probabilistic 
policy (at an appropriate reduced premium) to a policy 
that pays off with certainty.  
we analyze a different type of PI than the one 
originally addressed by Kahneman and Tversky. The 
original version of probabilistic insurance was selected 
for study because it was analytically tractable and led 
to the surprising result that a risk averse expected util-
ity maximizer favors probabilistic over standard insur-
ance. However, it has the special feature that in the 
event that the claim was not paid, the premium would 
be refunded. This contingency dose not adequately 
capture the risk of default or fraud because in these 
instances a premium refund might be problematic. In 
this article we investigate a more natural form of prob-
abilistic insurance that dose not involve refunding of 
premia.  
Ambiguity is generally defined as indeterminacy of 
an unique subjective probability due to missing informa-
tion about the decision problem. Many empirical studies 
have found significant evidence of ambiguity affecting 
decision making. For example, Kunreuther et. al (1995), 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1985, 1986) studied lottery choice 
in experiment; Heath and Tversky (1992), Fox and 
Tversky (1995) analyzed lottery choice in actual events; 
Maenhout (2004) and Lin, Pan, and Wang (2005) 
showed the effect of ambiguity on portfolio selection in 
finance. We empirically investigate the influence of the 
ambiguity on the decision to buy hypothetical earthquake 
insurance and the relationship with individual character-
istics based on an econometric model using questionnaire 
data.  
3.  Survey data 
Questionnaires was sent out by mail to 3,000 
households in Joyo city, Kyoto in the middle of January, 
2006. Samples are randomly selected from the NTT 
telephone book. 681 responses have been collected (the 
response rate is 23.4%). 
Necessarily, this survey is hypothetical. It is impos-
sible to have real incentives paid to the respondents. 
One could devise similar experiments for real money. 
In earthquake insurance setting, however, the probabil-
ity and loss of the relevant event have to be considera-
bly lower and larger than the lottery choice in experi-
ment respectively. Therefore, the stake would have to 
be affordably low, which makes the experiment com-
pletely different from the earthquake insurance setting 
we want to consider. Hence, we believe that in this 
domain, thought experiments for large sums can be 
more instructive than real experiments for pennies.  
Fortunately, there is evidence indicating that there 
is no difference in response for respondents with and 
without real payments. Beattie and Loomes (1997) 
designed an experiment to investigate the relevance of 
real incentives in decision problems and concluded that 
“in simple pairwise choices, incentives appear to make 
very little difference to performance.” Further evidence 
is presented by, among others, Grether and Plott (1979), 
and Conlisk (1989), and is surveyed in Camerer (1995).  
Binswanger (1981) reports absence of significant dif-
ference in his analytical results between individuals 
participating in an experiment with real money or only 
playing a hypothetical game. Similarly, Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999) compare 74 experiments and conclude 
that financial versus hypothetical incentives in experi-
ment occasionally improve performance although often 
do not. 
The questionnaire are structured as follows. First, 
the hypothetic situation is presented. Then the willing-
ness to pay for full covered insurance and for probabil-
istic insurance are asked. 
(H) Imagine that you have a house worth 10 mil-
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lion yen and the other asset (e.g. cash, stocks, or land)
worth 20 million yen. Assume that earthquake with a 
seismic intensity 7 on the Japanese scale will occur
with probability of 5% in 25 years (or, 0.205% per
year). If such earthquake happens, your house will be
half destroyed (¥5 million loss) with 50% probability
and completely destroyed  (¥10 million loss) with
50% probability.
(A). What is the most you would be willing to pay for
an insurance policy that will cover all damages due to 
earthquake?
(B) Imagine that you have been offered a different pol-
icy that is identical to the previous one expect that
there is about 1% (or 5%, 10%) unreimbursement
risk. That is, there is a possibility with about 1% (or
5%, 10%) that your claim will not be paid in case of 
half collapse and only half of your claim will be paid
in case of complete collapse. This risk is caused by
the adjuster’s too strict assessment. What is most you 
would be willing to pay for probabilistic fire insur-
ance?
These data indicate that probabilistic insurance is 
relatively unattractive. Figure 1 shows the number of 
the respondent in each category of willingness to pay.
(A) is full covered insurance and (B) is probabilistic
insurance respectively.
Fig. 1  Willingness to pay for  (A) full insurance and
(B) probabilistic insurance
From this figure, we can see that most respondents
are located in upper left, which means the large reduc-
tion of the value by switching from the full covered
insurance to the probabilistic insurance. It is notewor-
thy that while the majority of the respondents were
willing to pay above the actuarially fair premium for
full covered insurance, the majority of respondents
were not willing to pay the actuarially fair premium for
probabilistic insurance.
4. Model
To examine the influence of ambiguity of insur-
ance payment, we analyze the data based on both the
Expected Utility (EU) model and Maximin Expected
Utility (MEU) model. EU is most widely used to
model decision making under uncertainty. However it
can not represent observed individual choice under
ambiguity. MEU is the generalized expected utility
model to deal with the ambiguity developed by Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). we explain EU first, then de-
scribe MEU.
4. 1 Expected Utility Model
In the full covered insurance setting above, a deci-
sion maker has the prospect
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where is the value of the house (10 million yen) 




1S is the probability of half collapse (0.1025%
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Under EU, willingness to pay for the full covered
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where )(u is a utility function and v~  is expected
utility without any insurance.
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In the probabilistic insurance setting, the objective
prospect is written as 
),;2/,;,( 210 WqYWqYWqQ  ,(A)
where )(1 210 SSD  q , )( 211 SSD  q , 02  q
and D is unreimbursement risk (1, 5, 10%).  can
be interpreted as the objective probability distribution
when the decision maker has the probabilistic insurance.
Q
(B)
Under EU, the willingness to pay for the probabilistic



















4. 2  Maximum Expected Utility Model
Maximin Expected Utility (MEU) model is gen-
erally written as below.
  )()(min)( sdPsfufV
SCPMEU ³  (3)
where is a state of world, is an act
that maps a state into an outcome,
Ss oSf :
P  is a subjective
probability, is the set of subjective probability dis-
tributions that the decision maker has. That is, C repre-
sents the ambiguity that the decision maker may perceive
in the decision problem. This idea is supported by the 
fact that we can naturally accept the prediction with some
range such as "some event will occur with 0%~5%".
Each probability distribution
C
P  in  is a "possible
scenario" that the decision maker envisions. MEU im-
plies that a decision maker behaves in the worst case of
his expected scenarios.
C
































where is a sub-
jective probability distribution. As for the full covered
insurance, MEU is reduced to EU since no ambiguity
exists.
),;2/,;,( 210 WpYWpYWpP  
To estimate the model, the form of  is necessary
to be specified. We apply robust control theory of Han-
sen and Sargent (2001). The right side of equation (4)
can be seen as “a constraint robust control problem” if




where  is relative entropy between),( QPR P and .Q












Hansen and Sargent (2001) shows that the constraint
robust control problem has a same solution with “a mul-






















The parameter T in the last problem (5) can be inter-
preted as an implied Lagrange multiplier on the con-
straint Kd),( QPR . Since is convex in ,






















































Thus, the probabilistic insurance purchase decision 
























5. Examination of Risk Aversion
To examine the effect of risk aversion on the deci-
sion to purchase the earthquake insurance, we estimate
the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion J .
We assume that the relative risk aversion is constant in 









The relative risk aversion may vary across demographic
groups. Thus we connect it with respondent’s social
characteristics in linear
ȕxc 0JJ
where 0J is a intercept, is a vector of respondent’s
characteristics variables, and is a parameter vector.
x
ȕ
Random utility model is applied to estimate the 
model. The value function consists of random part and
non-random part. Respondent i choose  ifjB
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Table 1 The estimation results under EU
Indicator Variables  (N=506) mean
Age Age (in yeas) 62.0
Gender Dummy; 1 if respondent is male 0.912
Married Dummy; 1 if respondent is married 0.945
Childe Dummy; 1 if respondent has a childe (under 10 years old) 0.077
Education Dummy; 1 if respondent graduated an university or graduate school 0.379
Unemployed Dummy; 1 if respondent is unemployed 0.279
Self-employed Dummy; 1 if respondent is self-employed 0.103
Civil servant Dummy; 1 if respondent is a civil servant 0.073
Experience Dummy; 1 if respondent has experienced a economic loss from earthquake 0.074
Purchase Dummy; 1 if respondent has purchased an earthquake insurance 0.311
Never_Paid Dummy; 1 if respondent has never received any insurance payment 0.337
Distrust Dummy; 1 if respondent distrust insurance companies 0.454
)()()( 1 jiiiji BVwtpVBV d H ,
where are bidsBs )( 11 Jjj BBBB   ""
shown to the respondent as insurance fee. Assume that
H follows normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
































where is the normal distribution function. This
log likelihood is maximized to estimate parameters.
)()
Table 1 provides the explanation of independent
variables and these sample means. Table 2 shows the
estimation results for full covered insurance and prob-
abilistic insurance. “Estimated gamma” represents the
estimate of relative risk aversion. Positive value of J
implies risk aversion and negative value means risk
prone. The J  of  the full covered insurance is plau-
sible value, 1.6276 while that of the probabilistic in-
surance is -17.176, which is too low to accept. The
unreasonably low value of J  for the probabilistic
insurance implies that EU is unable to represent the
decision to buy that insurance.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) and Gollier (2001)
said by the thought experiment that the coefficient of
relative risk aversion lies within the range from 1 to 4. 
The empirical literature support this. Friend and Blume
(1975) studied the demand for risky assets and con-
ducted that J  generally exceeds unity and is probably
greater than 2. Using expenditure data, Weber (1975)
estimated J to lie within a range from 1.3 to 1.8, and 
Szpiro (1986) obtained a similar range using aggregate
time-series data on property insurance. In a careful
study of consumption, Hansen and Singleton (1982)
found relative risk aversion parameters ranging from
0.68 to 0.97. In a subsequent study of investments,
Table 2 The estimation results of J  under EU
Full covered insurance Probabilistic insurance
Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
Intercept 1.2561 0.000 -17.635 0.000
Age 0.0047 0.000 0.0091 0.000
Gender 0.1267 0.001 0.0616 0.259
Married 0.0123 0.056 -0.1044 0.126
Childe 0.0792 0.038 0.1083 0.024
Education -0.0775 0.000 -0.0897 0.002
Unemployed -0.1246 0.000 -0.0941 0.005
Self-employed 0.0118 0.483 0.0299 0.476
Civil servant 0.0746 0.077 -0.1090 0.043
Experience 0.0118 0.493 -0.0836 0.110
sigma 7.6284 E-5 0.212 4.7355 E+23 0.946
Estimated gamma 1.6276 -17.176
N 506 506
Log likelihood ratio 0.0456 0.0676
*The p-value are based on a two-tailed test that true coefficient is zero. 
㧙㧙
Hansen and Singleton (1983) found numerical esti-
mates of J , most of which ranged from 0.26 to 2.7,
with outliers as low as -0.359 and as high as 58.25. 
Mankiw’s J study of consumption spending ob-
tained relative risk aversion estimates ranging from
2.44 to 5.26 for nondurable consumption and from
1.79 to 3.21 for durable goods consumption.
As for full covered insurance, this estimation re-
sults suggest that EU works well. The obtained rela-
tionship between risk aversion and respondent’s char-
acteristics is mostly consistent with the previous
knowledge in the empirical literature. In previous stud-
ies, the relation between risk aversion and age is not
unequivocal. Barskey et al. (1997) report a negative
relation (up to age 60-64), while Riley and Chow
(1992) and Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) for over 65
age and Donkers et al. (1999) for all age show a posi-
tive relation. Our result supports that risk aversion in-
crease in ages. we found in our loss-gambling that men
are statistically significantly more risk averse than
women. It is also founded by Schubert et al. (1999).
Married respondents exhibit significantly risk aversion
than unmarred ones. It is also founded by Halek and 
Eisenhauer (2001). We found that self-employed are
less risk averse than employee. Praag (1996), Cramer
et al. (2002), and Barskey et al. (1997) report a lower
risk aversion for the self employed. The effect of edu-
cation on risk aversion is negative. The result is also
reported by Binswanger (1980, 1981) and by Donkers
et al. (1999).
6. Examination of Ambiguity Aversion
The previous section shows EU can not explain the 
decision to purchase the probabilistic earthquake in-
surance while it works well for full covered insurance.
We now show that the aversion to probabilistic insur-
ance is consistent with MEU. From the viewpoint of
risk (or objective probability distribution), full covered 
insurance and probabilistic insurance are very close.
Therefore, ambiguity parameter T  will be estimated
given that the coefficient of relative risk aversion for
probabilistic insurance is same with that for full cov-
ered insurance.
The ambiguity size may vary across demographic
groups. Hence we connect it with respondent’s charac-
teristics in linear, 
ȕxc 10.005.001.0 TTTT
where 01.0T , 05.0T  and 05.0T are dummy variables
(=1 if unreimbursement risks are 1%, 5%, and 10% re-
spectively), is a vector of respondent’s characteris-
tics variables, and is a parameter vector.
x
ȕ
Table 3 shows that the estimation results for full
covered insurance and probabilistic insurance. “Esti-
mated theta for 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10” represent the es-
timate of ambiguity parameter for unreimbursement
risks 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.










Never_Paid  0.6195E-4 0.121
Distrust 4.2387E-4 0.070
sigma 9.1406E-5 0.000
Estimated theta for 0.01 4.9338E-3
Estimated theta for 0.05 6.9684E-3
Estimated theta for 0.10 8.5078E-3
N 506
Log likelihood ratio 0.0377
We cannot compare this result with previous 
knowledge in literature since this paper is first to esti-
mate the ambiguity parameter with cross-section data.
However, some empirical studies using aggregated
data exist in finance. Maenhout (2004) calibrated T
to be 71.428 E-3 and 4.2194 E-3 respectively using a 
long annual sample from 1891 to 1994 and quarterly
postwar sample from 1947.2 to 1996.3. These values
are not so different from our results. 
The relationship between risk aversion and re-
spondent’s characteristics is consistent with the com-
mon sense except Purchase. Positive parameters
means the correspondent variables increase ambiguity
and enlarge the gap between objective and subjective
probabilities. The ambiguity increase with age and is 
larger for male. High education (university or graduate
school) and experience of a economic loss from earth-
quake reduce the ambiguity though these effects are
not statistically significant. Respondents who have
never received any insurance claim (including mobile,
injury, fire, and life insurance) or distrust the insurance
company perceive more ambiguous to insurance pay-
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Table 4  Subjective probability under MEU
Į= 1% Į= 5% Į= 10% 
Objective probability 0.00205% 0.01025% 0.02050%
Subjective probability 0.2104% 0.2717% 0.3000%
Ratio (subjective/objective) 102.7 26.5 14.6
ment. The positive coefficient of Purchase means that
purchase of the actual earthquake insurance raise the
ambiguity. This seems against our expectation. How-
ever, we can interpret this result as meaning that only
people with high ambiguity tolerance buy the actual
earthquake insurance because it has some unreim-
bursement risk.
Table 4 shows the subjective and objective prob-
ability that the respondent’s hypothetical wealth is 25
million less insurance fee. In our setting, the case of 20 
million wealth level has never happened if he buy the
probabilistic insurance. Thus, we can focus on the
probability 20 million wealth level since the probability
of 20 million can be calculated by it. This shows that
the subjective probability become 10 ~ 100 times big-
ger than the objective probability due to the ambiguity
aversion.  We can notice that the subjective probabil-
ity dose not so vary across the unreimbursement risks
while the objective probability proportionally changes
with them.
Table 5 shows the risk and ambiguity premium that 
are additional payments to buy earthquake insurance
because of risk and ambiguity, respectively. Here, a
willingness to pay consists of expected loss, risk pre-




Table 5 Risk and ambiguity premium (Yen)
Į= 1% Į= 5% Į= 10%
Expected loss 15,273 14,863 14,350
Risk premium 5,725 5,661 5,551
Ambiguity premium -13060 -16132 -17151
Willingness to pay 7937 4391 2750
A 1% unreimbursement risk reduces more than
half value of earthquake insurance. This result is simi-
lar with the outcome of the experiment survey con-
ducted by Wakker, Thaler, and Tversky (1997) where
respondent exhibit more than a 20% reduction in the
willingness to pay in order to compensate for 1% un-
reimbursement risk in life insurance setting. The dif-
ference between 1% and 5% is larger than that between
5% and 10%, which suggest that the marginal effect of
ambiguity aversion with respect to unreimbursement
risk declines.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we used data from the survey where a
set of questions on hypothetical earthquake insurance is
present. We empirically investigated the effect of am-
biguity on the decision to buy hypothetical earthquake
insurance and the relationship with individual charac-
teristics. The main results of this paper may be summa-
rized as follows.
First, we have observed that people dislike prob-
abilistic insurance: Most respondents demanded more
than 50% reduction in premium to offset a 1% unre-
imbursement risk. Second, we have demonstrated that
such preferences are generally inconsistent with ex-
pected utility theory. Third, we have shown that the 
reluctant to buy probabilistic insurance is predicted by
the Maximin Expected Utility model. Forth, the ambi-
guity that respondents perceive is larger in men who
purchase earthquake insurance, have never received
insurance payment, and distrust insurance companies
than each correspondents. And it increases with age,
education level.
In the classical economic analysis, insurance is ex-
plained by concavity of utility. In MEU theory, insur-
ance is explained by ambiguity aversion. The observed
aversion to probabilistic insurance suggests that the 
purchase of insurance is driven primarily by the ro-
bust-prone to ambiguity rather than by diminishing
marginal utility.
Although this paper dealt with the earthquake in-
surance, there are many other decision problems in
which one perceive the ambiguity for the outcome
from the investment to reduce the probability of some
hazard. Examples are earthquake retrofit, medical
check-ups and the installation of burglar alarm. Our 
result suggests that guarantee of their performance or
complete recompense in case of failing may dramati-
cally increase their value.
㧙㧙
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